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The world of research is changing 
very rapidly from huge governmental 
after war projects like Manhattan 
(nuclear bomb) and Apollo (Space, 
reaching moon) project and peace-
ful use of nuclear energy to 
dynamically allocated specific aim 
projects with dynamically changing 
teams and, of course, still military 
projects. In line with this tendency, 
European countries established high 
level scientific institution supported 
with large financial budgets.  
 
Meanwhile we saw a huge increase 
in the publications far beyond the 
genuine need for sharing results 
within the scientific community. This is 
basically due to the criteria applied 
for fund allocation and for personal 
scientific careers that are mostly 
targeted on literature production 
and participation to official events. 
 
As a new field of applied research, 
Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) 
had no community, no allocated 
budget, no funding schema and no 
publication channel dedicated to 
this terrific strategic subject. Initial 
important work like the paper by 
Rinaldi et al. – "Identifying, 
understanding, and analysing critical 
infrastructure interdependencies, 
Control Systems, IEEE, 2001” – 
appeared in a journal on "Control 
Systems" because dedicated CIP 
journals were lacking. 
 
After five years of an ad hoc expert 
group promoting CIP, the European 
Commission released a 
Communication of December 12, 
2006 on a European Programme for 
Critical Infrastructure Protection 
[COM(2006) 786 final – Official 
Journal C 126 of 7.6.2007] and two 
years thereafter the EU started to rule 
the field on legal level by the 
Directive of Dec 2008.  
 
CIP Newsletter were made available 
in the US (CIP Report) and in the EU 
(European CI(I)IP Newsletter from 
2002 respectively 2006 and more 
followed.  
National efforts in CIP (conferences 
and exercises) started late 90ies and 
have been growing with emerging 
awareness. 
 
The scarcity of literature has been 
recognized and we are happy to 
observe today more than a dozen 
available books and even more will 
be edited in the next period. CIP 
Journals from Elsevier and 
Inderscience are available, and IEEE 
provides a journal on dependability. 
Still, CIP issues are being discussed in 
journals dedicated to other more 
classical topics, but this is about to 
change. 
 
The dissemination framework of CIP is 
complemented by international 
conferences such as CRITIS, the 
International Conference on Critical 
Infrastructure (CRIS), and recently 
CIPRE. 
 
Although CIP is of public interest, 
some achievements have to be kept 
secret because of national defense, 
Transparency, otherwise typical in 
science, is not always first priority in 
the field of CIP. NISAC in the US 
represents a compromise between 
the need for secrets and synergic 
capability of open scientific 
communities. The concept of EISAC 
might be good for Europe as well.  
 
And finally, we are happy that the 
CIP community, besides researchers, 
includes also stakeholders like policy 
makers, suppliers and operators. Their 
trustful collaboration is a prerequisite 
for leveraging the R&D investments 
made in CIP. 
 
We are very happy to announce 
CRITIS’14 with over seventy 
submissions on the next page, and 
offering a coming together of the 
CIP community. 
www.critis2014.org  
 
Enjoy reading this issue of the ECN! 
 
PS: Authors willing to contribute to 
future ECN issues are very welcome, 
just drop an email. 
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Editorial: Community Building: Why is it 
that important, and what do we get?  
In CIP we need local communities, national, European and worldwide 
communities. Also it is important that all these communities remain in 
exchange. And what is the role of journals and books? 
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www.critis2014.org 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(see last article  
and last page) 
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The conference on “Security Liaison 
Officer as a part of Critical 
Infrastructure Protection strategy”, 
held the 25th June at the Italian 
Chamber of Deputies in Rome, has 
been the final act of the European 
project “SLO – Security Liaison 
Officer”. The project, co-funded by 
the “Prevention, Preparedness and 
Consequence Management of 
Terrorism and other Security-related 
Risks Programme” (CIPS) of the DG 
Home Affairs of the European 
Commission, is ending after a 14-
month activity. The project has been 
developed with the cooperation of 
two main partners, Complex Systems 
and Security Lab of University 
Campus Bio-Medico of Rome 
(Coordinator), supervised by Prof. 
Roberto Setola, and the Romanian 
Association for Critical Infrastructures 
and Services Protection (ARPIC), with 
the support of the Italian Association 
of Critical Infrastructure Experts (AIIC), 
BC Manager, ASIS International 
Chapter Italy, and Transelectrica, as 
associate partners. 
The Security Liaison Officer figure is 
mentioned in the Article 6 of the 
Council Directive 2008/114/EC as the 
contact point between the Critical 
Infrastructure operators and the 
public authorities in charge for 
Critical Infrastructure protection. As 
stated in the Directive “Security 
Liaison Officers (SLO) should be 
identified for all designated ECIs in 
order to facilitate cooperation and 
communication with relevant 
national critical infrastructure 
protection authorities. With a view to 
avoiding unnecessary work and 
duplication, each Member State 
should first assess whether the 
owners/operators of designated ECIs 
already possess a Security Liaison 
Officer or equivalent. Where such a 
Security Liaison Officer does not exist, 
each Member State should take the 
necessary steps to make sure that 
appropriate measures are put in 
place. It is up to each Member State 
to decide on the most appropriate 
form of action with regard to the 
designation of Security Liaison 
Officers”. The Directive overlooks 
many aspects which should 
characterize the figure of the SLO, 
namely his background, his tasks and 
responsibilities, his position inside the 
company, his role in a critical 
situation (before, during, or after a 
crisis), and his relationships with the 
other European Security Liaison 
Officers. 
The project, aiming to define a 
common framework regarding the 
Security Liaison Officer duties, 
collected the points of view of 
several countries, in order to achieve 
a possible standardization of the SLO 
profile. This research has been carried 
out through the data acquisition by 
means of three different sources: 
review of the most popular standards 
and regulations on the subject, 
acquisition of specific information 
about actual facts and aspects via 
online questionnaires and interviews, 
elicitations of ideas via brainstorming 
activities during workshop cafés. 
The data collection from open-
sources and most popular standards 
has revealed the diversity of ideas 
regarding the Security Liaison Officer 
figure. While a new Romanian 
resolution is very clear regarding the 
role and the background (military) of 
the SLO, other European Countries 
have a different implementation of 
the security-related roles in their 
organizations, whether recognized as 
critical or not, sometimes having a 
clear implementation of a profile 
similar or corresponding to the SLO.  
To find out the opinions of people 
involved in the security issues, four 
different online questionnaires have 
been devised, depending on the role 
of the responder (Public Authority, 
Chief Security Officer, Staff Security 
Officer, Academia). 
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The Security Liaison Officer as a part of 
the European Critical Infrastructure 
Protection Strategy 
The Directive 114/2008/EC is the starting point for a European strategy for the 
Critical Infrastructure Protection. The SLO project aims to overcome the 
regulatory gap related to the profile of the Security Liaison Officer.  
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In the period from October 2013 to 
May 2014, more than 200 
questionnaires have been collected, 
from 34 different countries (19 
Member States and 15 non-Member 
States). 
The main objective of the SLO survey 
is to perform a snapshot of the 
current organizations’ security 
context and to identify the most 
relevant trends. 
From the collected data, it appears 
that the security budget for the next 
five years will be aligned with those 
experienced in the past. Given the 
current budgetary constraints within 
the EU and abroad, this continuing 
upward trend of funding is further 
evidence of the sizeable attention 
that security is garnering. This increase 
in attention towards security is further 
emphasized by the data showing an 
incremental growth in the number of 
persons involved within the security 
division.   
	
 
Considering the different dimensions 
of security, the most important aspect 
results to be personnel security: nearly 
a quarter of respondents considered 
personnel security as the most 
essential domain, stressing the utmost 
importance attributed to the person-
nel inside a company (a large 
relevance is also attributed to safety). 
 
However, the collected data shows 
that in the last five years there was a 
considerable boost in the security 
standards for the physical and cyber 
security domains, while personnel 
security standards received much less 
attention.  
The result is a balanced approach 
towards security, further 
confirmed by the CSO 
category answers regarding 
resource allocation, as 
showed in the figure. 
Another interesting aspect 
analysed is the 
background of the 
personnel involved in 
security. Indeed, 
even if 46% of the 
CSOs have a 
background in the law 
enforcement or military fields, 
the actual composition of a 
security team is more 
articulated with a 
prevalence of competence 
in Computer Science, 
Business Administration and 
Engineering. This stresses the 
importance to complement the 
education with managerial and 
process-based competencies. 
 

 
Going more in-depth on the aspects 
directly related to the Council 
Directive 114/08/EC, there is only 
moderate familiarity with it (less than 
50% of CSOs have knowledge of the 
EPCIP programme). Even more 
resounding is our analysis regarding 
the CIWIN network, which was 
evaluated as “unknown”, “not 
relevant” or simply unused by the 
majority of responders. This limited 
knowledge regarding the EPCIP 
programme represents a partial 
contradiction with respect to 
the conclusions of the 
European Commission Working 
Document SWD(2013)318. This 
discrepancy can be partially 
explained taking into account 
that our questionnaires were 
mainly oriented toward private 
sector, while the primary 
customers for the European 
Commission are the 
governments (in fact the PAs 
involved in the questionnaire 
have a discrete knowledge of 
the programme). 
The SLO questionnaire results have 
been  completed and deepen by 
several interviews with Critical 
Infrastructures Security Managers and 
Public Authorities, which common 
request is for a regulatory 
standardization of the Security Liaison 
Officer professional profile, in order to 
establish common and cogent 
guidelines in case of critical situations 
which can involve European Critical 
Infrastructures. 
A further important mean for elicit 
  	 
  	

	
		
	

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information and opinions from 
security experts has been the 
organization of three Workshop Cafés 
in three different European Countries 
(Bucharest, Romania – October 2013, 
Rome, Italy – February 2014, The 
Hague, The Netherlands – May 2014) 
in order to collect opinions reflecting 
Member States’ different regulations 
and cultural business schemes. 
 
The workshop cafés (WSCs) focused 
on three separate elements of the 
SLO profile: Skills, Role and Tasks. 
These elements were analyzed during 
brainstorming activities and resulted 
in numerous innovative ideas and 
future elements for consideration. 
These results have been achieved 
thanks to the participation in the 
WSCs from about 100 Security experts 
from Academia, Public Authorities 
and Critical Infrastructure Companies 
from different countries. 
According to most of the WSC 
attendees, the SLO must have the 
function of connecting not only 
structures, but also tasks and persons, 
playing a fundamental role to 
integrate the company activities and 
coordinate the personnel. 
He/she must be able to 
communicate to all directions within 
the company and to connect all the 
divisions/departments of the 
company. Additionally, they must 
also be in contact with the other 
Security Liaison Officers, authorities 
and law enforcement officers. His/her 
main role must be, therefore, a link 
between the organization and both 
the National and European Public 
Authorities and other Critical 
Infrastructures. 
To carry out these tasks, the SLO must 
be a person with good 
communication skills, able to 
motivate people, and in particular 
have a strong commitment from the 
top management. In this perspective, 
being primarily a 
coordinator/facilitator able to 
effectively communicate inside and 
outside the organization, the SLO 
needs to be at a top management 
level into the company, referring 
preferably to the company board of 
directors. The SLO should have 
experience in management, though 
not necessarily former experience in 
the law-enforcement or military field. 
However, the SLO should have a 
wide competence on his own 
organization and his sector, along 
with knowledge regarding other 
sectors, technologies and legislations 
in security matters, and a mandatory 
continuing training process should be 
aligned with context changes. 
He/she must have a security 
clearance and it is preferable if 
he/she also had some professional 
certificate or adequate academic 
degree. During the WSCs, also novel 
vulnerabilities stemming from the 
implementation of dramatically 
differing policies, particularly difficult 
for companies operating in many 
Member States, were analyzed. 
 
 
The results of the data acquisition has 
been integrated during the gap 
analysis phase, where all the 
information has been merged in 
order to define common features for 
the SLO and for his relationships with 
the Public Authorities and the other 
European SLOs.  
The first evidence coming from the 
SLO project data is that the SLO figure 
is considered, from both CI operators 
and PA, an effective element to 
manage the complex relationships 
existing between CI and PA, where 
the SLO could allow them to use a 
common vocabulary, simplify the 
procedures and construct more 
effective strategies and solutions. 
This is also due to the change of 
paradygm of the security, that now 
deals with service continuity, 
company reputation, management 
of crisis situations, etc. This imposes to 
have a multi-disciplinary security 
team whose numerical dimension has 
also continued to increase in the last 
years. Consequently our data 
illustrates the existence of a strong 
motivation to establish a standard 
profile of the SLO figure, and to 
introduce a more cogent and 
specific regulation on the subject to 
allow the cooperation of Security 
Liaison Officers.  
 
 
 
From the amount of data collected 
during the project, it emerged that 
the term “OFFICER” is quite 
inappropriate. Several experts 
expressed some concerns about the 
term because it could apply a  
“military-oriented” connotation that 
might induce a wrong bias with 
respect to his/her essential role. 
Indeed the SLO is primarily a 
“LIAISON”, to serve as an interface 
between the CI organization the PA 
or other operators. To effectively 
perform his/her work, the SLO should 
be familiar with all the threats that 
are impacting the organization. 
Hence it is a largely shared opinion to 
appoint a person already within the 
company having, then, a deep 
knowledge of the corporate 
processes and activities.  
However, a mandatory continuing 
training process should be aligned 
with contextual changes and an 
adequate academic background is 
more and more required.  
The majority of data identified a 
good collocation of the SLO in the 
Security Department or as member of 
the Board of Directors.  
There is an important debate 

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regarding the opportunity for the 
existing CSOs to also serve as the SLO. 
This is because there are overlapping 
knowledge/skillsets between these 
two professional profiles. However, 
our data stressed that it should be 
preferable to have two separate 
professional figures.  
To operate effectively, also the Public 
Authorities should introduce figure 
similar to the SLO in order to facilitate 
the information exchange. 
A final consideration is on the word 
“SECURITY” in the SLO label. From the 
project, the need emerges to 
mandatorily consider All-Hazard 
approaches to guarantee the 
capability of the different 
infrastructures to supply their essential 
services to the citizens. With this vision 
in mind, it appears more suitable to 
use the meaning of the Italian term 
“SICUREZZA”, which embraces a 
holistic vision of both the accidental 
and malicious threats, hence Safety 
& Security.   
It is highly desirable for the SLO figure 
to have a unified framework 
facilitating the definition of his/her 
role inside a company, for that which 
concerns his/her relationships with PA 
and other CIs, and to facilitate 
information sharing. In this way, the 
PA can participate in the process of 
designating a SLO inside CIs releasing 
guidelines and criteria for eligibility. 
 
A synthesis of the collected data and 
results can be found in the Final 
Report of the SLO project, released 
during the Final Conference of the 
project that can be now 
downloaded at www.coseritylab.it. 
More information and results about 
the project can be requested to the 
project coordinator mailing to 
contacts@coseritylab.it. 
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Critical Infrastructures and 
Extreme Weather  
 
Resilience of Critical Infrastructure (CI) 
to Extreme Weather Events (EWE) is 
one of the most demanding challen-
ges for both government and society. 
Extreme Weather (EW) is a key 
phenomenon that can cause severe 
threats to the well-functioning of CI. 
The effects of various levels of EW on 
CI will vary throughout Europe. These 
effects are witnessed through 
changes in seasonal means and 
extreme value frequencies of 
regional extreme temperatures (high 
and low), humidity (high and low), 
extreme or prolonged precipitation 
(rain, fog, snow, ice, etc.) or 
prolonged lack thereof (drought), 
extreme wind or lack of wind, and 
thunderstorms. The increased 
frequency and intensity of EW can 
cause events such as flooding, 
drought, ice formation, wild fires etc. 
which present a range of complex 
challenges to the operational 
resilience of CI. 
 
 
 
The economic and societal 
relevance of the dependability and 
resilience of CI is obvious: 
infrastructure malfunctioning and 
outages can have far reaching 
consequences and impacts. The cost 
of developing and maintaining CI is 
capital intensive if they are expected 
to have a realistic functional and 
economic life (i.e. 50+ years). Hence, 
future EW has to be taken into 
account when considering protective 
measures, mitigation measures and 
adaption measures to reflect actual 
and predicted instances of CI failures. 

The INTACT project  

The INTACT project will address these 
challenges and bring together 
innovative and cutting edge 
knowledge and experience in Europe 
in order to develop and demonstrate 
best practices in engineering, 
materials, construction, planning and 
designing protective measures as well 
as crisis response and recovery 
capabilities. All this will culminate in 
the INTACT Reference Guide, the 
decision support system that 
facilitates cross-disciplinary and cross-
border data sharing and provides for 
a forum for evidence based policy 
formulation.  
 
The objectives of the INTACT project 
are to: 
 
• assess regionally differentiated 
risk throughout Europe 
associated with extreme 
weather; 
• to identify and classify on a 
Europe wide basis CI and to 
assess the resilience of such CI to 
the impact of EWE; 
• raise awareness of decision-
makers and CI operators about 
the challenges (current and 
future) EW conditions may pose 
to their CI; and,  
• identify potential measures and 
technologies to consider and 
implement, be it for planning, 
designing and protecting CI or 
for effectively preparing for crisis 
response and recovery. 
 
Findings of the project will be 
accumulated in the INTACT 
Reference Guide. This guide will 
support decision makers and CI 
operators with best practices and 
methodological approaches to 
protect their CI against EWE 
 
The INTACT project has been 
launched on May 01, 2014 and will 
deliver its final results in 2017. TNO is 
coordinator of the project consortium 
with eleven partners from eight 
countries: CMCC (IT), DELTARES (NL), 
FAC (IRE), DRAGADOS (SP), HR 
Wallingford (UK), PANTEIA (NL), NGI 
(NO), CSIC (SP), UN University (GE), Un 
Ulster (UK), VTT (FI) 
INTACT receives funding from the 
European Union Seventh Framework 
Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under 
grant agreement n° FP7-SEC-2013-
606799. 
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INTACT 
On 1st of May 2014, a new EU project started on the Impact of Extreme 
Weather on Critical Infrastructures
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The PREDICT project is a new research 
project of the FP7 security call topic 
SEC-2013.4.1-2: Better understanding 
of the cascading effect in crisis 
situations in order to improve future 
response and preparedness and 
contribute to lower damages and 
unfortunate consequences. The 
PREDICT project has started on April 
1st 2014. 
 
Abstract 
 
PREDICT will provide a 
comprehensive solution for dealing 
with cascading effects in multi-
sectorial crisis situations covering 
aspects of critical infrastructures. The 
PREDICT solution will be composed of 
the following three pillars: 
methodologies, models and software 
tools. Their integrated use will 
increase the awareness and 
understanding of cascading effects 
by crisis response organizations, 
enhances their preparedness and 
improves their response capability to 
respond in case of cascading failures. 
 
PREDICT project will start from a deep 
analysis of recent cases (over 8500 
incidents worldwide), which will be 
accompanied with scenarios of 
potential crisis. Project partners will set 
up a generic approach (common 
framework) to prevent or mitigate 
cascading effects which will be 
applied in selected cases agreed 
with end-users. 
 
As modelling each phenomenon 
separately in a specific environment 
is not effective, PREDICT project will 
propose cohesive and 
comprehensive models of 
dependencies, cascading effects 
and common mode failure which will 
include causal relations, multi-
sectorial infrastructure elements and 
environment parameters, as well as 
the human factor aspects. 
 
PREDICT will deliver software tools 
bundled in PREDICT Incident Evolution 
Tool, which will consist of two core 
components: a Foresight and 
Prediction Tool (for simulation of the 
evolution of cascading effect and 
impact on multi-sectorial 
dependencies) and a Decision-
Support Tool (for determining the best 
course of action and to calculate the 
risk associated with them). 
 
The high quality of the developed 
solutions will be assured by a 
consortium consisting of a number of 
experienced partners joining 
research, industrial (incl. SME), and 
end-users approaches. End-users will 
be deeply involved in PREDICT at 
three levels: as partners of the 
consortium (there are three end-users 
in the consortium), members of the 
Advisory Board, and representatives 
from relevant organisations across 
Europe invited to regular workshops.   
 
Objectives 
 
 
 
 
 
   	
	  	 #
  %
&  	 
		   #
	  	
 	  	
	"
   
   
	! 
 	 	  
$
$  	  		#
 	 	 
		   
	"   	
 	  
 	  
		
   
	%	 #
	  		  		&
			
"
Dominique Sérafin 
 
Dominique Sérafin (PREDICT 
project coordinator) is a business 
developer at CEA in the field of 
critical infrastructure protection. 
He is also an expert in the field of 
electromagnetic effects and their 
consequences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
e-mail: dominique.serafin@cea.fr 
 
CEA,DAM,GRAMAT,F-46500 
Gramat, France 
PREDICT: PREparing for the Domino 
effect In Crisis siTuations 
 
The goal of the FP7 PREDICT project is to provide a solution for dealing with 
cascading effects in multi-sectorial crisis situations. 
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The new methods and tools 
developed within the PREDICT project 
may reduce the negative impact of 
possible, future cascading effects 
and the improve planning of civil 
protection and crisis management 
operations. The PREDICT results will 
help lowering losses and damages in 
various fields, including economic or 
social safety and security. In order to 
bring this new quality into the 
cascading effects and crisis 
management domain, the proposed 
project will achieve the following 
detailed operational and technical 
objectives: 
 
1- Gather and analyse available 
domain knowledge (e.g. historical 
data, crisis situation scenarios, 
policies, and procedures, expert 
knowledge) in order to create a solid, 
empirically proven background for 
the project and explore newly 
discovered information on cascading 
effects. Carrying out extensive and 
detailed analyses will enable 
investigating currently known and 
identifying new triggers (originating 
incidents, purpose acts or natural 
disasters) of cascading effects in crisis 
situations. Moreover, taking into 
consideration dependencies among 
various interconnected critical 
infrastructure sector elements and 
other not considered to be critical 
under existing policies, together with 
such triggers will help to determine 
probable cascade paths. Cascade 
paths (possible, different chain of 
events triggered by a single incident 
or act) will be used to study the 
influence of the crisis incidents, 
cascading through specific 
components of the dependent 
system (different sectors, products, 
services etc.). The gathered 
knowledge will also help identifying 
and measuring the strongest 
relationships, assessing threats, risks 
and magnitude of possible impact 
associated with the cascading 
effects and taking into account cross-
border effect. 
 
2- Develop a common framework 
that will be an organised set of 
definitions, methodologies, scenarios, 
typologies, best practices etc., 
building a common base for each 
specific PREDICT solution end-user, 
but also for cooperation of various 
actors. The common framework for 
understanding cascading effect will 
gather and structure all of the factors 
affecting cascading effect and 
results of the carried analysis. This 
framework will be also used to define 
a set of quantitative and qualitative 
metrics and indicators for measuring 
the influence of cascading effect, 
taking into account econometric 
information about value of goods 
and services. 
 
3- Create models of cascading 
effects and interdependencies being 
a structured and formal way of 
describing such effects. These models 
will include causal relations, multi-
sectorial infrastructure elements and 
environment parameters and 
possible human influence (human 
factor) on the state of crisis situation. 
Moreover, they will identify the key 
points in the incident evolution where 
decisions are needed, and the need 
for specific dependency and 
cascading risk information from 
stakeholders. These models also need 
to identify the type of decisions 
required, including preventive and 
preparation decisions. Executable 
versions of such models will be used 
for cascading effect simulation 
purposes. 
 
4- Develop a suite of software tools 
for the simulation of cascading 
effects, decision support and 
creating collaborative expert 
networks and personnel training. 
These tools will help the PREDICT 
solution end-users to introduce new 
scenarios, simulate them and assess 
the potential decision-makers 
procedures in terms of their efficiency 
and effectiveness during a crisis. 
Continuous evaluation of the PREDICT 
solution outputs will be ensured by a 
dedicated expert network support 
tool. The developed suite of tools will 
be used in both preparedness and 
reaction phase of a crisis, allowing 
extensive virtual trainings and near 
real-time analysis of the situation. The 
developed tools will be suitable for 
assessing vulnerability of contingency 
plans, foreseeing consequences of 
complex crisis situations and 
determining the preconditions for 
failure of critical infrastructure. 
 
5- Validate the solution through 
running simulations based on existing 
and developed cascading effects 
scenarios and using the developed 
models and tools. Such simulations 
will take into account infrastructure 
elements and relationships between 
them, environmental conditions, 
economic parameters, human 
behaviour and many other factors 
directly or indirectly affecting the 
course of the crisis situation. These 
simulations will be used to perform 
models behaviour test, which aim at 
comparing the simulation-generated 
states of crisis situation with the 
observed reference behaviour. This 
will ensure the validity of developed 
solutions and help to improve results 
of the project. Moreover, such 
simulation might be used to generate 
a set of different, possible cascading 
effect scenarios. Due to a close 
cooperation with potential end-users, 
the PREDICT solution is considered to 
be deployed for them, for testing 
purposes and possible operational 
use. 
 
6- Disseminate project results and 
build appropriate liaisons among 
various project stakeholders starting 
from end-users involved in the project 
(at various levels), members of 
Advisory Board, other end-users’ 
representatives (five workshops will be 
organised with end-users external to 
the project), as well as general 
public. Moreover, the project results 
will be presented on forums and 
conferences related to crisis 
management and critical 
infrastructure topics. Additionally, the 
consortium will build connections 
between the PREDICT project and 
other, related initiatives, projects and 
programmes. 
 
The Partners 
 
CEA (France), ITTI (Poland), 
Fraunhofer (Germany), THALES 
(France), CEIS (Belgium), TNO (The 
Netherlands), VTT (Finland), VRZHZ 
(The Netherlands), SYKE (Finland), UIC 
(France), TRT-NL (The Netherlands). 
 
If you would like to know more about 
PREDICT please visit regularly our 
website at www.predict-project.eu 
 
 
“Any publicity made by the 
beneficiaries in respect of the project, 
in whatever form and on or by 
whatever medium, must specify that 
it reflects only the author’s views and 
that the [the Union] [Euratom] is not 
liable for any use that may be made 
of the information contained 
therein.“ 
 
“PREDICT has received funding from 
the European Union’s Seventh 
Framework Programme for research; 
technological development and 
demonstration under grant 
agreement no 607697”. 
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On the 19-20th May 2014, CIP 
operators from the Energy, Transport, 
ICT and Water sectors met in Ispra 
(Italy) for the 2nd ERNCIP Operators’ 
Workshop, organized by the 
European Reference Network for 
Critical Infrastructure Protection 
(ERNCIP) [1].  
 
 
 
Operators highlighted the need for 
templates of scenario-based exer-
cises so as to exercise on hypothe-
tical scenarios where practical 
decisions are needed. Exercises at 
national and EU wide scale, based 
on common threat scenarios, would 
be needed. Moreover, modelling 
efforts could drive the development 
of scenarios to be used for analysing 
possible cascading effects. While 
cost and confidentiality are a 
concern, operators value the 
opportunity to test their people and 
systems and to discover problems. 
 
Scenarios in CIPRNet 
 
The CIPRNet project [2] currently 
designs such scenarios in order to 
develop, test and train users on the 
novel capabilities offered by the 
project. An example scenario is a 
flood-related, cross-border emergen-
cy in a densely populated region of 
the border between The Netherlands 
and Germany. In order to design the 
scenario, existing approaches were 
reviewed.  
 
While pure CIP exercises on an EU 
level are quite rare, several exercises 
are performed annually under DG-
ECHO’s civil protection mechanism 
[3]. We explored publicly available 
information and exercise reports, 
focusing mainly on flood-related 
scenarios. 
 
The exercises found were interna-
tional; several Member States (MS) 
are participating as players to the 
exercise. In most cases though, the 
actual incident affects a limited geo-
graphical area of one MS, which 
requests assistance by neighbouring 
MS.  
 
Having a cross-boundary effect in 
terms of consequences is increasing 
the complexity of the exercises. It 
requires the coordination of opera-
tions across various countries and it 
exhausts available resources for 
international assistance. It also intro-
duces communication problems. 
Communication and interoperability 
are identified as key factors in most 
exercises, even if these are limited 
within one region.  
 
How to design CIP 
scenarios? 
Most exercises mention key assets 
and their condition. This information is 
important because (a) infrastructure 
disruptions affect the population and 
modify the needs for evacuation, 
medical care or rescue (water 
contamination, power disruption etc.) 
and (b) because they may be a 
resource for the command control 
and crews of the exercise. Therefore, 
it is also important to identify whether 
the centre of operations and the 
deployed teams have resources 
independent of the public and for 
how long they can maintain 
functions, without the need for 
resupplying.  
 
CIP scenarios should identify whether 
an infrastructure is critical for rescue 
or repair operations (such as a main 
transportation node, an airport, or a 
fuel or water supply station needed in 
order for teams to be deployed or 
supplied).   
 
One of the most important parameter 
to model in a CIP scenario is the 
condition of the directly affected 
infrastructures (e.g. water-related 
defences, in the threat of a flood). 
The type of damage or failure on 
these infrastructures can alter the 
scenario plot significantly but also the 
degree of damage it can cause.  
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Marianthi Theocharidou (JRC) 
 
Marianthi Theocharidou works as a 
scientific/technical support officer 
at the European Commission's  DG 
Joint Research Centre (JRC), 
located in Ispra, Italy. She 
participates in the activities of the 
CIPRNet project and the European 
Reference Network for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (ERNCIP). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
email: 
arianthi.theocharidou@jrc.ec.europa.eu 
CIP Scenarios: 
Lessons learnt from EU Exercises 
 
In the CIPRNet project, we explore how to design a threat scenario for CIP. 
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Scenarios in CIPRNet 
 
The CIPRNet project [2] currently 
designs such scenarios in order to 
develop, test and train users on the 
novel capabilities offered by the 
project. An example scenario is a 
flood-related, cross-border 
emergency in a densely populated 
region of the border between The 
Netherlands and Germany. In order 
to design the scenario, existing 
approaches were reviewed.  
 
While pure CIP exercises on an EU 
level are quite rare, several exercises 
are performed annually under DG-
ECHO’s civil protection mechanism 
[3]. We explored publicly available 
information and exercise reports, 
focusing mainly on flood-related 
scenarios. 
 
The exercises found were 
international; several Member States 
(MS) are participating as players to 
the exercise. In most cases though, 
the actual incident affects a limited 
geographical area of one MS, which 
requests assistance by neighbouring 
MS.  
 
Having a cross-boundary effect in 
terms of consequences is increasing 
the complexity of the exercises. It 
requires the coordination of 
operations across various countries 
and it exhausts available resources 
for international assistance. It also 
introduces communication problems. 
Communication and interoperability 
are identified as key factors in most 
exercises, even if these are limited 
within one region.  
 
How to design CIP 
scenarios? 
 
Most exercises mention key assets 
and their condition. This information is 
important because (a) infrastructure 
disruptions affect the population and 
modify the needs for evacuation, 
medical care or rescue (water 
contamination, power disruption etc.) 
and (b) because they may be a 
resource for the command control 
and crews of the exercise. Therefore, 
it is also important to identify whether 
the center of operations and the 
deployed teams have resources 
independent of the public and for 
how long they can maintain 
functions, without the need for 
resupplying.  
 
CIP scenarios should identify whether 
an infrastructure is critical for rescue 
or repair operations (such as a main 
transportation node, an airport, or a 
fuel or water supply station needed in 
order for teams to be deployed or 
supplied).   
 
One of the most important parameter 
to model in a CIP scenario is the 
condition of the directly affected 
infrastructures (e.g. water-related 
defences, in the threat of a flood). 
The type of damage or failure on 
these infrastructures can alter the 
scenario plot significantly but also the 
degree of damage it can cause.  
 
 
 
Moreover, several other 
infrastructures may face common-
cause or cascading disruptions that 
augment the impact and complexity 
of the scenario. In the case of a flood 
scenario, we identified the following 
possible disruptions: 
 
• transport disruptions due to flood-
related accidents (derailment, 
collision of road vehicles, collision 
of maritime vehicles, structural 
elements collapse or overflow, 
e.g. tunnels, bridges, airports etc.) 
• transport disruptions due to large 
scale evacuation of civilian 
causing traffic congestion  
• disruptions of water supply or 
contamination of drinking water 
or other health hazards  
• hazardous substances (CBRN) 
incidents due to structural 
damages/flooding on facilities  
• hazardous substances (CBRN) 
incidents due to accidents to 
transporting vehicles, 
• collapse of sewage systems 
• electrical power supply 
disruptions 
• telecommunications disruptions 
• medical care facilities disruptions, 
due to power shortage, flooding, 
increased number of patients or 
inability of the personnel or 
supplies to reach the location 
• industrial or business disruptions, 
due to power or communication 
disruptions. 
 
Such disruptions, related to the threat 
scenario studied, should be included 
in the storyline. To increase the 
difficulty of the scenario, they can 
also be accompanied by other 
unrelated events, such as natural 
disasters, accidents or man-made 
incidents that modify the capacity of 
infrastructures.  
 
The modelling of dependencies 
between infrastructures also indicates 
points of information flow required 
between different infrastructures and 
among different sectors.  
 
Each scenario would be helpful if it is 
supported with historical data on 
previous, similar experiences in the 
geographic area. Such sources can 
provide useful information on the 
impact of the scenario and whether 
critical infrastructures can be 
affected. The scenario can also draw 
on similar experiences in 
neighbouring countries or regions. If 
such information is not available, 
other resources can be used, such as 
risk assessments that support the 
development of such a scenario in 
the specific region. CIP scenarios can 
also be used in order to examine 
unprecedented or unlikely events or 
complex scenarios, as this may also 
provide useful insight to decision 
makers, especially in terms of 
resources and critical infrastructure 
resilience. 
 
A parameter examined in several 
scenarios is the introduction of 
conditions where resources are 
stressed or exhausted from previous 
incidents. Such incidents can be of 
similar nature but of a smaller scale 
(smaller scale floods, other incidents 
caused by the severe weather) or 
unrelated incidents in neighbouring 
regions (such as fire accidents, man-
made attacks, etc.). Two alternative, 
but similar storylines can be 
exercised, where the difference lies 
on the availability of key resources in 
a specific point in time. 
 
Most scenarios were supported by 
maps and screenshots of various 
phases of the incident. In some cases, 
the maps were limited, difficult to 
comprehend or read and with limited 
explanation. Each designed scenario 
should aim for clear and 
comprehensive visualizations, as this 
will enable to demonstrate clearly the 
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storyline and simulation results of the 
scenario.  
 
Such visualizations can depict a 
screenshot of each phase (day, hour, 
etc.) of the scenario, marking 
affected infrastructures and other 
points of interest. For example, in 
most EU exercises the field exercise 
areas and the Center of Operations 
are marked clearly on the map. 
Other examples, include, locations 
where manned teams are needed 
for search and rescue, for repairing 
key infrastructures, etc. 
 
In several cases, the timeline of 
events remained unclear and time 
periods were mixed. It would be 
useful if textual and graphical 
representation is used in order to 
describe the situation (state of 
operation on key infrastructures, 
location of deployed teams, extent 
of a natural phenomenon or 
accident etc.) for specific, clear and 
district points of time, in a structured 
way. 
 
The scenarios can range from early 
prognosis or alert signs, several days 
before the actual initiating event 
occurs. In some cases, preceding 
events of previous months were 
described1. Important points of time 
are major changes in the 
development of scenario, e.g. 
changes in weather conditions, man-
made incidents or infrastructure 
disruptions.  
 
The time of occurrence can also alter 
significantly the outcome of a 
scenario. For example, the scenario 
can be affected by daily or seasonal 
or miscellaneous parameters. For 
example, an event in the area that 
increases the population (e.g. a 
festival, conference or convention) 
can increase the population 
affected. Similarly, the time of an 
event may alter the location of most 
vulnerable individuals or communities 
(e.g. event during school hours). 
  

The selection of the day zero of a 
scenario can vary from the EU exercises, 
as it is usually marked by the activation of 
the mechanism for requesting 
international assistance.
Moreover, a realistic scenario should 
reflect the interaction and decision-
making needed both by public and 
private CI operators. Since public–
private cooperation structures differ 
from country to country, the selection 
of varying cases or models of 
cooperation could be interesting to 
investigate among different 
scenarios.  
 
Another parameter which needs to 
be taken into account is the 
scalability of the scenario, as the 
number of countries, operators and 
institutions is increasing. Therefore, it 
would be useful if the scenarios have 
a varied level of complexity, so as to 
identify the point where the use of 
the modelling capabilities poses 
limitations or on the contrary helps 
decision makers to overcome this 
obstacle. 
 
 
 
 
One of the few table-top exercises 
focused on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection [4] also highlights the fact 
that the participants in such exercises 
share different levels of CIP expertise, 
which is a parameter that one needs 
to take into account when designing 
CIP scenarios. This means that the 
exercises should pose gradual, 
increasing difficulty to participants.  
For example, the scenario should 
firstly ask the participants to 
recognize the CIs present, identify 
their dependencies and then 
examine the international or cross-
sectorial dimension of them. 
 
Summary 
 
In summary, a scenario should serve a 
clear goal. A threat or a combination 
of threats (phenomena) needs to be 
selected for study. Then the scope of 
the exercise needs to be decided. 
This may refer to the geographical 
region, the timeframe, the involved 
stakeholders or the resources 
available. Creating a clear timeline is 
very important and for this reason, in 
the CIPRNet project, we decided to 
describe each phase according to a 
specific template which covers the 
following information: 
• Timeframe / Duration: This can be 
marked with specifics points of 
time or specific events 
• Incident description: This reflects 
the current situation of the 
phenomenon/threat studied 
• Affected infrastructure(s): 
Information to be included is the 
name, the sector, the location, 
the operational status and the 
mode of operation (e.g. normal, 
stressed, recovery, etc.) for each 
affected infrastructure.  
• Maps: This is needed in order to 
depict visually the status of each 
phase. 
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One of the main technological 
outcomes of the EU-FP7 CIPRNet 
project[1] will be a Decision Support 
System (DSS) able to provide a 24/7 
service to CI operators and 
emergency (crisis) decision-makers 
providing a continuous risk assess-
ment of CI elements due to natural 
threats.  The proposed DSS will 
encompass the whole workflow of 
actions ranging from the forecast of 
natural hazards to the prediction of 
the physical damages expected for 
the CI elements as a consequence of 
the threats manifestations, to the 
evaluation of the impacts that the 
physical damages will produce on 
the services delivered by the CI and 
the ultimate consequences that the 
reduction (or loss) of services will 
produce on citizens, primary services, 
industrial sectors and the enviro-
nment.
 
The architectural design of the DSS 
has been performed by taking into 
account security issues. These have 
been considered at three different 
levels: physical, informational (IT) 
and organizational. At the physical 
level, security concerns with the pro-
tection of equipment and resources 
from damage and harms. Protective 
barriers and access control pro-
tocols are typical physical security 
measures. The information security 
concerns with data and information 
protection against unintended and 
/ or unauthorized access. Organiza-
tional security level is, in turn, related 
to policies, procedures allowing 
users sharing sensitive information. 
 
In this contribution we will initially 
recall the CIPRNet Risk Assessment 
Loop and the DSS architecture. 
Then, we will focus on some security 
aspects (i.e. physical and network 
access security, data and services 
availability and trusted information 
sharing) related to the above 
mentioned security levels. 
 
Risk Assessment Loop and 
DSS architecture 
 
The CIPRNet Risk Assessment Loop 
(RAL) is composed of 5 Functional 
“Bricks” (Bn):  
 
B1 - Monitor natural phenomena. B1 
actions feed the DSS Risk Assessment 
Loop with external data coming from 
natural events monitoring sensor 
networks (e.g.  geo-seismic, 
meteorological data) and data 
resulting from simulation model for 
natural events forecasting; 
 
B2 - Prediction of natural events. The 
output of this phase is the prediction 
of the intensity of the different threats 
manifestations on a given area. For 
example, B2 may indicate that, in a 
given time frame, a particular region 
and/or city will be impacted by 
heavy rain and strong wind of 
specific intensities; 
 
B3 - Prediction of harm scenarios. B3 
will compare the B2 output with CI 
vulnerability data, in order to 
estimate the CI elements that will be 
affected (with a given probability) by 
the predicted natural threats. 
“Affected” means that the CI 
elements will be set in off-state or in a 
state of reduced functionality;  
 
B4 - Impacts and consequences 
estimation. B4 represents the most 
complex task as it performs a number 
of different evaluations and will be 
performed by a tight collaboration 
between CIP experts and CI 
operators.  B4 will initially provide the 
expected impacts on the CI (in terms 
of reduction or loss of functionality) 
and then the consequences, due to 
CI impacts, expected on citizens, 
industrial sectors, environment and 
the primary services (e.g. hospitals, 
schools); 
 
B5 - Design of efficient strategies to 
cope with crisis scenarios and Repor-
ting.  
 

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Table of Content 
Data management and Information 
sharing in CIPRNet DSS 
 
The CIPRNet DSS enables a 24/7 risk analysis of the CI elements, providing these data to 
the appropriate national authorities appointed for CIP and CI operators. The nature of the 
1) exchanged data and 2) the involved DSS end-users requires a well-defined security 
plan. 
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On the bases of Impacts and 
Consequences, the DSS could also, in 
some specific cases, develop 
optimized strategies to solve critical 
situations; these strategies could be 
prompted to the operator’s attention, 
serving as a basis to develop real 
actions, to take over critical 
situations. 
 
RAL is implemented through the 4-tier 
architecture as shown in Figure 1 
 


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The Presentation Layer contains the 
different components used to 
visualize the RAL results in an friendly 
user interface. In particular, the GIS 
advanced interface allows the end 
users to visualize CI elements risk 
maps and overlay this information 
with other information as, for 
example, impacts and consequen-
ces  analysis  results.  
The Service Layer contains the 
different modules that realize the DSS 
business logic. In particular, this layer 
contains the RAL and the Information 
Sharing and Collaborative (ISC) 
platform. Other services are for 
example DSS System Admin services 
to manage the platform, DSS Analysis 
services to manage analysis tasks on 
the available data/simulations and 
DSS simulation service to manage 
and control simulation tasks. 
The Middleware Layer implements 
procedures to gather, on a 24/7 
basis, data coming from external 
sources as, for example 
meteorological data in order to get 
information to feed models and 
simulations enabling the prediction of 
future extreme natural events (e.g. 
flooding).  In particular, the Data 
Access Manager will implement 
solutions to make the CIPRNet 
Persistence Layer compliant with the 
basic requirements for database and 
network security.  The first part of this 
contribution describes the proposed 
servers and databases configuration 
(related to the CIPRNet DSS Italian 
instance) to ensure the physical 
database integrity and network 
access control requirements.    
The DSS Knowledge Base Layer is 
composed of different sub 
components:  
-CIPRNet data.  These are stored and 
managed using CIPRNet systems and 
applications. In turn, CIPRNet data 
will be further categorized as Public 
(i.e. data that can be accessed by 
generic end users using web 
applications and/or web services) 
that will be stored within the Private 
CIPRNet DB. Examples of private data 
are: users, identities and roles data, CI 
vulnerability data, Information Sharing 
and Collaborative (ISC) data, CI 
network topologies data and 
CIPRNet analysis results data. Private 
data will be stored within the Private 
CIPRNet DB. The CIPRNet security 
plan envisages two network and 
database different security levels for 
the two categories of databases;  
-External data. In general, external 
data are stored in external 
databases. The DSS may rely on 
external data in different phases of 
the Risk Assessment Loop. For 
example, B1 relies on external sources 
of data. In B1, the DSS continuously 
receives data form different sources: 
seismic monitoring networks (e.g. in 
Italy these data are stored and 
managed by the Italian  
 
 
 
Geophysics and Volcanology 
Institute), meteorological stations 
(e.g. in Italy the stations are 
controlled by the Italian Air Force Met 
Office), pluviometric networks and so 
on; 
-Data and information shared with 
DSS end users (e.g. CI operators, Crisis 
Management, Local Authorities). For 
example, the DSS RAL requires that CI 
operators exchange with CIPRnet 
experts data and information 
regarding the possible reduction of 
the QoS of their CI network related to 
an expected harm scenario (e.g. the 
DSS builds an expected harm 
scenario related to a future flooding 
event in a specific city area). The 
CIPRNet experts will use these data 
within the impact assessment phase 
in order to update the expected 
harm scenario considering possible 
cascading and dependency 
phenomena. As described in the 
following, the CIPRNet DSS will rely on 
a secure ISC platform to share and 
exchange data and information with 
the CIPRNet end-users. 
 
IT and Physical Security 
 
Figure 2 shows the CIPRNet servers 
and databases configuration of the 
Italian CIPRNet DSS instance. The DSS 
server (running the Risk Assessment 
Loop, the Data Access Service, GIS 
modules), the ISC server as  well as 
the CIPRNet Private DB will be hosted 
in the ENEA UTMEA Computer Centre. 
The UTMEA Computer Centre has the 
following characteristics: 1) the 
hardware and frameworks are hosted 
in a locked room (only authorized 
ENEA staff members can access the 
room), 2) the computer centre is  
 
 
 
equipped with a fire system and UPS 
system. Moreover, as shown in the 
Figure 2, ENEA UTMEA building (where 
CIPRNet servers will be located) is 
located inside the ENEA Casaccia 
Research Centre, a 24/7 access 
controlled Centre equipped with a 
 
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system of doubled high security 
fence.  Then, the ENEA server 
configuration is compliant with the 
basic physical security requirements.  
 
Regarding network access control 
requirements, the DSS servers and the 
CIPRNet Private DB are protected by 
two firewalls: a) the CIPRNet servers 
software-based  firewalls and b) by 
the ENEA Casaccia firewall and 
monitoring systems that constitutes 
the main barrier to ensure access 
control to CIPRNet data and systems. 
Another relevant aspect in 
information security is the availability 
requirements to ensure that DSS 
services and data will be accessible 
as much as possible (in general the 
availability requirements are specified 
through minimum acceptable 
thresholds percentage of the time 
the service is available) to final end 
users even in case of equipment 
failures. In the following, the solution 
adopted for the Italian CIPRNet DSS 
instance for data and services 
replication will be described. In 
particular, this second part of the 
contribution concentrates on the 
technological solutions adopted to 
ensure a High Available server 
system. 
 

 
Figure 3 shows the master/Salve 
CIPRNet DSS configuration. In 
particular, this configuration envis-
ages the set-up of a replica of 
database servers, file system as well 
as the other main DSS services (Risk 
Assessment Loop, ISC and GIS 
services). In the described 
configuration, only the master or the 
primary server can modify data. The 
slave is managed as a warm standby 
server, that is, it cannot be accessed 
until it is promoted master (another 
possible solution would be to have 
hot standby server, that is, it can 
accept connections and serves read-
only queries). In order to guarantee 
the synchronization and the 
coherence of the database replica, 
the adopted solution will make use of 
Transaction Log Shipping [2]. Using 
this technique, the warm server is 
kept current by reading a stream of 
write-ahead log (WAL) records. In 
particular, the master server sends to 
the slave server log files containing all 
transactions that have been 
performed in the master database.  
In case of failure, the slave database 
server can use the log file to update 
the slave database with the last 
logged transactions.  In general, this 
replica solution can be applied to 
manage redundant distributed 
geographically   database servers 
(Figure 3). For example, for the Italian 
DSS instance the standby servers may 
be hosted in the Deltares (The 
Netherlands) research centre. Then, 
the Italian DSS may be operative 
even in the case the ENEA UTMEA 
Computer Centre is totally not 
operative. 
 
 
 
Trusted Information  
Sharing 
 
Within the DSS RAL there are different 
phases where there will be the need 
of exchanging trusted and 
confidential information among 
different players. For instance, during 
the B1 and B2 phases, scientists can 
share sensitive documents and 
information in order to increase the 
confidence level about a future 
extreme natural events prediction 
and share this information with other 
actors like Civil Protection, Police 
Force, Crisis Managers and DSS 
operators.  
During the B3 and B4 phases, DSS 
operators and CI operators will 
exchange sensitive information in 
order to build an Expected CI Harm 
Scenario is the result of an extreme 
natural event (e.g. flooding).  Figure 4 
shows the information sharing process 
involved in the CI Harm Scenario 
Impact Assessment Loop that 
produces as result the Expected CI 
Harm Scenario. 
 

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For example, let suppose that within 
the B2 phase the DSS predicts a 
flooding (the threat) of a certain 
intensity on a particular area of the 
city of Rome. The flooding intensity 
data and the CI elements 
vulnerability data w.r.t to flooding 
events will be used in B3 in order to 
build the so called Initial CI Harm 
Scenario. In this initial scenario some 
CI elements of different CI networks 
may be in failure state. The DSS 
operator will send this information to 
all involved CI operators. In turn, the 
CI operators are requested to 
provide to the DSS the excepted 
impact (in term of the reduction of 
the QoS) induced by these failures on 
their networks. This information will 
feed an “system of systems” simulator 
to evaluate possible cascading 
effects induced by dependency and 
interdependency phenomena 
among CI. These phenomena, in 
general, may change the CI Harm 
Scenario and these information will 
be circulated with the CI operators 
within the CI Harm Scenario 
Assessment Loop until the Expected 
CI Harm Scenario is produced when 
a predefined equilibrium criteria is 
reached. 
Last but not least, the DSS operator 
would need to share sensitive 
information with crisis decision makers 
"
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during the B5 phase in order to 
distribute the Risk Assessment and 
Consequences Report to the 
involved actors.  
At the end, the CIPRNet DSS needs to 
share information of various types 
with different players. In general, the 
process of sharing information in 
different DSS RAL phases would 
require the application of different 
policies and different security 
constraints. To meet these 
requirements, we have designed the 
“CIPRNet Information Sharing & 
Collaboration (ISC) Module” that will 
be inserted into the DSS RAL by 
purposely customizing the outcome 
of a previous EU project (NEISAS, 
National & European Information 
Sharing & Alerting System [3]). NEISAS 
project aimed at increasing security 
and trust in the exchange of 
information between CI operators 
and stakeholders. To this aim, NEISAS 
developed a framework consisting of 
a model and a platform for 
information sharing, attempting to 
ensure data integrity, confidentiality 
(anonymity) and trust, security and 
service availability. 
The NEISAS information-sharing model 
guarantees information sharing by 
means of “trust circles”. 
A trust circle consists in a group of 
people exchanging information using 
the NEISAS platform. It is composed of 
users with trustmaster and member 
role. The former role has manage-
ment functionalities, as the ability to 
define advanced sharing rules 
between different trust circles, which 
are not enabled to the latter. The 
trustmaster is seen as a trusted 
coordinator and manager of a 
trusted information-sharing group. 
She/he is a member of a government 
agency or a trusted member elected 
as a representative of the group. 
Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht 
gefunden werden. shows possible 
trust circles sharing sensitive 
information within the CIPRNet DSS. 
 
The NEISAS platform provides the 
following advanced functionalities:  
• Traffic-light protocol for alerts [4]. 
It is a policy used to categorise 
information as white (unrestric-
ted information), green (com-
munity-wide, but not released 
outside the community); amber 
(limited distribution on a need-
to-know basis), and red 
(personal, for named recipients 
only). 
• Information sharing on a one-to-
one basis or with a specific 
group of members or other trust-
circles 
• Anonymous posts [5]. If sensitive 
information to be shared could 
potentially cause embarrass-
ment to the originator’s organi-
zation from a business perspec-
tive, the trustmaster could play a 
key role. The originator of the 
information may ask the trust-
master to advise other members 
about a specific topic, but to 
conceal her/his identity.  
• Information Rights Management 
[6]. It offers a further level of 
security, as the content of an 
IRM protected alert cannot be 
copied or printed 
 
Finally, besides the security aspects 
(at technical and organizational 
level), the NEISAS platform has been 
conceived as a Web 2.0 platform in 
the critical infrastructures domain by 
managing users (with their roles and 
digital identities), content and data 
to be shared. 
 
CIPRNet DSS Security Plan 
 
In this contribution some aspects 
related to computer security have 
been described in the context of the 
CIPRNet DSS implementation. In 
particular, the contribution described 
the solutions and configurations 
adopted for the Italian instance of 
the DSS. The CIPRNet security plan 
encompasses many security aspects 
ranging from data base security to 
network security. In general, the 
CIPRNet security plan will drive the 
choice of every technologies and/or 
system that will be adopted. In this 
contribution we described in detail: 
Physical Database Security, 
Database and services availability, 
Network Security (Access control) 
and Organizational Security (Based 
on the NEISAS trust-circles).  
 
Acknowledgement 
 
This work developed from the FP7 
Network of Excellence CIPRNet, 
which is being partly funded by the 
European Commission under grant 
number FP7-312450-CIPRNet. The 
European Commission’s support is 
gratefully acknowledged. 
 
References  
 
[1] CIPRNet FP7 EU Project – 
www.ciprnet.eu  
[2] PostegreSQL 9.3 manual 
[3] NEISAS (National & European 
Information Sharing & Alerting 
System) European Research Project 
(Project ref: JLS/2008/CIPS/016) 
[4] Sutton, D., Cappelli M., Das-
Purkayastha A., Bologna S., De Nicola 
A., Rosato V., Garwood A., Harrison J., 
Pollard D., Skellorn W. (2011). NEISAS 
Dissemination – Final Report.  
[5] Sutton, D., Harrison, J., Bologna, S., 
& Rosato, V. (2013). The Contribution 
of NEISAS to EP3R. In Critical 
Information Infrastructure Security 
(pp. 175-186). Springer Berlin 
Heidelberg. 
[6] Information Rights Management. 
http://technet.microsoft.com/it-
it/library/dd638140(v=exchg.150).asp
x  
	


ECN 18 European CIIP Newsletter Volume 8 issue 2 23  
There is a huge demand for cyber 
security professionals willing to put 
their energy and passion into the field 
of cyber security research and 
defense. We need professionals who 
will network, who are willing to further 
their education and do not shy away 
from political discussions.  
We, the Swiss Cyber Storm 
association, believe that it is the 
community’s own responsibility to 
find, train and coach the most 
talented people for now and the 
future. That's why Swiss Cyber Storm is 
providing a suitable platform where 
security professionals can obtain and 
exchange information with regard to 
current cyber risks and cyber-attacks 
and defense topics.  
 
However, another, maybe even more 
important point is to motivate enough 
young talents to pursue a career in IT 
security to meet the growing 
demand for cyber security 
professionals. 
 
Getting involved 
 
One problem with this is that there 
are so many “cool” opportunities in IT 
which are much more visible to 
young talents than a career in IT 
security. To improve the odds, we 
have to make IT security more visible 
and tangible to both scholars and 
students.  
 
And that’s exactly where Swiss Cyber 
Storm comes in. Its purpose is:  
• Encouraging young talents to 
pursue a career in IT security 
and to promote this topic 
among scholars and students 
• To organize an international 
IT security conference on 
Cyber Attacks and Defense 
at which decision makers, IT 
security professionals and 
young talents meet to discuss 
current and future 
challenges in IT security. 
Security Challenges 
 
Inspired by the success of the Cyber 
Security Austria association, who 
initially performed their first national 
cyber security challenge back in 
2012, we decided to adapt the 
concept for Switzerland. The first Swiss 
challenges were then performed 
back in 2013. Suddenly the topic 
became quite a lot of attention not 
only among scholars and students 
but also in the media publishing 
reports and stories about the 
challenge. 
 
A simple receipt 
 
Organizing a challenge following the 
model of CSA is quite straightforward. 
First, you need a platform that can 
provide and run a wide variety of 
different security puzzles. Challenges 
include many different disciplines, for 
example web application security, 
crypto, forensics, penetration testing 
or reverse engineering tasks.  
 
Fortunately, the provider of the 
challenge platform (Hacking-Lab) 
being used by CSA was willing to 
support Swiss Cyber Storm on its way 
to organizing a similar event to those 
in Austria.  
 
Using Hacking-Lab, we then invited 
the most talented scholars and 
students to participate in the Swiss 
Cyber Storm Security Challenge final 
run in parallel to the Swiss Cyber 
Storm IT security conference in 
Lucerne.  
 
Crossing borders 
 
Since cyber security requires 
cooperation and trust,   

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Meet the Future Cyber Talent 
Swiss Cyber Storm is performing a 
National Cyber Security Competition 
 
With national concern about cyber security greater than ever, what can we 
do to help the public and private sector to stay ahead of today’s and 
tomorrow’s cyber security threats? 
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we wanted to reflect this by 
partnering with Cyber Security 
Austria. Together we set up the 
“Security Alpen Cup” where the most 
talented contestants from Austria and 
Switzerland "fought" against each 
other. This cooperation boosted the 
visibility of this initiative considerably 
and was for the benefit of both CSA 
and Swiss Cyber Storm, even though 
the Swiss team won the first Security 
Alpen Cup. 
 
Thinking big 
 
The next step now is to 
internationalize the idea and the 
event even further. A first step has 
been taken this year by inviting 
Germany to participate in this cross-
border event. Since the name 
“Security Alpen Cup” is no longer 
appropriate for an internationalized 
competition, the name has been 
changed to “European Cyber 
Security Challenge" .  
 
To make the challenges even more 
interesting and to foster international 
collaboration among young cyber 
talents, we invite other European 
countries to join the European Cyber 
Security competition.   
Becoming part of it 
 
If you now feel like doing the same in 
your country or if you just want to 
have a closer look at the next Swiss 
Cyber Storm Security Challenge, 
please do not hesitate to contact us 
at president@swisscyberstorm.com.  
 
Please safe the date and visit the 
upcoming Swiss Cyber Storm 
conference and award ceremony on 
October 22nd, 2014 at the KKL in 
Lucerne. For more details, please visit 
www.swisscyberstorm.com   
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During last decades the complexity 
of the full developed society has 
been steadily increasing. Any modern 
device is now endowed with some 
intelligent tools to improve its 
capabilities, to enhance its robustness 
and resilience, to reduce energy 
consumption, to moderate its price, 
to easy its recycling and optimize 
other characteristics such as size, 
portability etc. The introduction of the 
intelligent layer is not limited to the 
tools or devices, it extends to small or 
even large infrastructures. Any 
Museum, library or other public place 
is usually endowed with SCADA 
system for safety (anti-fire, anti-
intrusion etc.) and governance rea-
sons. Those SCADA systems allow for 
a constant monitoring and real time 
governance of the activities. The 
most dwelling and relevant systems 
that are presently permeated by 
intelligent devices are the large 
infrastructures such as pipelines, gas-
ducts, power plants, data centres, 
aqueducts, etc. All full developed 
infrastructures do strongly rely on the 
communication network, the elec-
tronic control system and automation 
software. Moreover almost all other 
infrastructures depend on others such 
as the Electric System, the Transport 
(at least for employs availability and 
maintenance) and most of them on 
water supply. The owners of the 
Infrastructures are normally able to 
handle the majority of undesired 
situations by means of suitable mea-
sures (often also organic contingency 
plans) and in several cases the 
resilience of the service they provide 
is assured. However even the 
actuation of measures requires the 
availability of (at least some)  other 
infrastructures they depend on. 
Therefore, a "systemic approach" is 
required to build up global measures 
and contingency plans implying the 
synergistic cooperation of the 
different infrastructures. In other words 
one has to deal with the "System of 
Systems" as a holomorphic unique 
entity. Due to the advent of the 
"smart society" the complexity of this 
“system of system” is destined to 
increase and  hence the role of the 
systemic framework is expected to 
become central. 
 
As commonly understood, the 
"Systemic Risk" is a concept 
employed in the world of finance to 
refer to the danger related to a 
potential collapse of an entire 
financial sector (or a market) due to 
its global structure and not to a 
specific weakness of one of its 
components. The same concept can 
be extended to full developed 
societies which functioning depends 
on a multitude of different interde-
pendent infrastructures. The most 
important infrastructures, that is those 
providing vital resources and 
sustaining the "quality of life" in the full 
developed countries, are often 
referred to as "Critical Infrastructures" 
(CI) and represent the core of such a 
complex organism that is human 
society. 
 
The functioning of CI's requires a 
strong control of several technologies 
and management capabilities that 
are essential for providing the service 
or good they are devised for. Those 
technicalities do deeply depend on 
the type of infrastructure and 
represent a fundamental know-how 
that needs a constant upgrade. 
Despite these differences, all the 
infrastructures share some common 
characteristics. The most relevant is 
their partition into units (components) 
that are geographically and functio-
nally separated and connected by 
cables, pipes or other links that allow 
transfer of the primary good or 
service. This characteristic is very 
special as it lends to a 
conceptualization of those systems as 
"networks" or, from the mathematical 
point of view,  "graphs". Moving steps 
from this fundamental observation at 
the end of the past century a novel 
discipline was born: the "Complexity 
Science" [1] . This branch of the 
human knowledge results from the 
combination of the Statistical 
Mechanics and the Graph Theory. 
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Netonets: Critical Infrastructures as 
Network of Networks 
During last years a new community was born aimed at combining experts 
from the Critical Infrastructures Protection and the Complexity Science. 
A book reviewing the state of the art of the field has recently appeared 
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The underlying idea is that when the 
number of components of a system 
increases (strictly speaking going to 
infinity) a collective  "emergent 
behavior" is observed and simple rules 
start governing its temporal evolution.  
Similarly to what happens to gases, 
we can disregard the details of 
interaction between molecules and 
the system is governed by simple 
thermodynamic equations. 
Analogously, when a, large enough, 
system of computers is attacked by a 
malware, its epidemic spread does 
not depend on the details of the 
propagation mechanism, but on the 
topology of the system and on the 
mere infection rate. 
 
The complexity Science paradigms 
has been successfully applied to 
several field from the biology to the 
social Science.   However, as 
explained above, to study the CI's 
one has to deal with systems of 
systems, that is, according to the 
complexity science paradigm, with 
“Networks of Networks” or "Netonets". 
It is worth stressing that netonets may 
result not only from the 
interdependences between networks 
of different types, but also from the 
aggregation of homogeneous 
networks that exhibit different levels 
of management or territorial 
organizations. A very important case 
is represented by the ENTSOE 
(European Network of Transmission 
System Operators for Electricity). In 
this case each of the TSO's governs a 
high voltage (400kV) transmission 
electric infrastructure while receiving 
or providing power to other networks.  
 
 
 
The ENTSOE system provides energy 
to some 500 millions people, assuring 
a complete phase synchronization all 
over the “Old Continent”. For this 
reason, it has been named the 
European "Beating Heart". Another 
example of network of homogeneous 
networks is given by the Autonomous 
Systems (AS's) of the Internet. The 
owner of each autonomous system 
provides names and IP numbers 
within its domain while 
communicating at boundaries by 
Border Gateway Protocols (BGP).    
Fig.  1  represents the graph of all AS's 
on Internet as it appeared on April 
2012: the system consisted of some 
30,000 AS's linked by some 300,000 
different connections.    
Despite the huge development of the 
Complexity Science, the 
technological community for the 
Protection of Critical Infrastructures 
has not yet fully benefit of that 
discipline. The Netonets community 
and its relative website 
(www.netonets.org) were born to 
fulfill the need of a bridge between 
the Complexity Science community 
and that of CIP (Critical Infrastructure 
Protection). Netonets rises from the 
coordinated efforts by Gregorio 
D'Agostino and Antonio Scala, aimed 
at inspecting the potentiality of such 
a hybrid community. Netonets has its 
own international committee formed 
by Raissa D'Souza, Shlomo  Havlin, 
Wolfgang Kroeger and  Gene Stanley 
that are among the most outstanding 
personalities in this emerging field. 
 
Under the egida of the Netonets 
community, several conferences on 
"Network of Networks"  have been 
organized. Among them it is worth 
noting the series carrying the same 
name: Netonets that took place 
along last four years in Europe and 
USA: 2011 (in Budapest),   2012 (in 
Chicago), 2013 (in Copenhagen) 
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and 2014 (in Berkeley (CA)) and the 
COINETS series: 2012 (in Bruxelles) and 
2014 (in Lucca). During the former 
events the majority of  scientist 
involved in the Netonets research 
have been invited, thus covering a 
great part of the whole subject. The 
network of excellence CIPRNET 
(www.ciprnet.eu) and the European 
project Multiplex (www.multiplex.eu) 
are among the most important 
European activities on the subject, 
moving from the CIP and the 
Complexity perspectives, respective-
ly. They both have endorsed different 
initiatives such as Netonets and 
Coinets, and have contributed signifi-
cant presentations to the confe-
rences. 
 
Several information on the different 
activities performed under the 
Netonets behalf are available on the 
website. To be kept informed on main 
improvement and events in neteo-
nets community, one may register in 
the website. 
 
The last frontier of 
Complexity Science 
 
Quite recently, the Netonets 
community has produced a book 
that represents an attempt to provide 
an organic presentation of the state 
of the art of the discipline. It presents 
most of the different applications of 
the “Network of Networks” paradigm 
to different fields from Physiology to 
CIP. This book has been entitled 
"Network of Networks: the Last Frontier 
of Complexity" [2] as it represents one 
of the most recent challenges of the 
Complexity Science. The book tries to 
present and combine the efforts from 
both the Complexity and the CIP 
community. Several theoretical 
models are presented, starting from 
the percolation of interdependent 
networks by the Boston University 
Group that has imposed the subject 
of “Network of Networks” to the wide 
scientific audience attention [3]. 
However the first real attempt to 
apply Complexity to Netonets was 
due to Ian Dobson, Carreras and 
David Newman [4] that dealt with the 
problem of failures propagation on 
interdependent networks (Hawaii 
conferences). Moreover an other 
important step toward the applica-
tion to real networks (in his case  the 
North America inter-connected 
electric systems) is due to Raissa 
D'Souza's group [5]. 
 
Beside this leading activities, quite 
recently, the problem of epidemics 
on Network of Networks has been 
also dealt with by a mere spectral 
approach at topological level [6]  
thus proving interesting exact inequa-
lities to predict the behavior of the 
global system. The influence of 
topology on synchronizability of 
netonets has been recently inves-
tigated [7].  These further develops 
are not presented in the book. 
 
 
 
Other approaches to interdependent 
networks at basically topological 
level have been presented in the 
book. Among others it is worth 
mentioning the “Multiplex” approach 
that is the oldest one (coming from 
early works in sociology) and  has 
been applied to social and financial 
netonets. The slight difference with 
the previous approach is that the set 
of nodes is common to all nets while 
the type of links have different types. 
 
All the former theoretical works show 
that some emergent behaviors are 
observed and even the mere topo-
logy of the systems play a non trivial 
role for its robustness. This could 
provide important advices for future 
network expansions and re-designing. 
However to achieve improvements in 
different directions, such as assessing 
contingency plans, dynamical risk 
assessment and “what if” analysis, the 
pure topological approach is not 
enough and some details on the 
actual functioning of the different 
systems and their interdependencies 
need to be introduced. To this 
purpose, the book provides best 
practices for risk assessment, agent 
base modeling and the software 
federation approach.  As for the 
workshops, several authors from both 
the CIPRNET and Multiplex contri-
buted to the book 
 
The book also provides realistic risk 
estimates for interacting networks 
(included financial systems), signi-
ficant applications to transport and 
even to physiology. Also a human 
body can be conceptualized to a 
system of systems and the techniques 
of analysis of signals in interacting 
system do represent an other useful 
tool that deserves more inspection 
also for technological infrastructures. 
 
We do believe that the book 
represents a good reference point for 
members of the novel hybrid 
community; however it can not be 
considered exhaustive: several other 
theoretical approaches have not 
been treated or deserve some further 
treatments. Certainly the I/O models 
should have been included among 
the most abstract conceptualizations 
and the systemic risk analysis is under-
rated. 
 
Future develops and 
needs 
 
From the mathematical point of view 
a very important field needs to be 
developed, that is the Statistical 
Mechanics of systems with finite or 
even small size. This is actually a 
critical point as real systems do 
exhibit a finite number of degrees of 
freedom. On the other side, there is a 
very important problem that is central 
and yet not appropriately treated 
that is the role of human arbitry. 
Decision makers and the collective 
behavior of operators and customers 
upon undesired events or unex-
pected situations should account for 
this issue in order to provide 
prediction for both the management 
of the different infrastructures. 
Understanding and modeling those 
critical elements requires the syner-
gistic application of different disci-
plines such as Sociology, Psychology, 
Economy and the domain knowled-
ge required to predict the conseque-
nces of the potential measures. Most 
of people or groups share similar inte-
rests and hence they are expected 
to exhibit common behaviors; there-
fore, again, netonets paradigm may 
represent a versatile tool to predict 
collective emergent behaviors. 
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The Master Class on Modelling, 
Simulation and Analysis of Critical 
Infrastructure was held on 24-25 April 
2014 at the International Union of 
Railways (UIC) Headquarters in Paris, 
France. The aim was to perform 
training and activities for the Critical 
Infrastructure Protection community. 
This 1.5 day training event is the first 
edition of a series of training events 
organised within the European FP7 
Project CIPRNet – Critical 
Infrastructure Preparedness and 
Resilience Research Network. The 
Master Class was successfully 
organised by the University Campus 
Bio-Medico of Rome in coordination 
with the International Union of 
Railways – UIC and the French 
Alternative Energies and Atomic 
Energy Commission – CEA.  
 
This meeting gave the opportunity to 
different research institutions to talk, 
exchange ideas, better know each 
other and create common views. The 
training attracted about 40 experts 
from CI operators, Public Authorities 
and researchers and experts from the 
Critical Infrastructure Protection 
research communities. The 
participants had the chance to learn 
about modelling, simulation and 
analysis of Critical Infrastructure. They 
were informed of its applications in 
analysis, decision support and 
training. Experts from the CIPRNet’s 
network presented lectures in order 
to explain basic concepts and 
advanced aspects related to 
federated simulation and the use of 
the Open Modelling Interface 
(OpenMI). 
 
The event was announced via the 
CIPRNet website and the registration 
was online. The number of 
participants was limited to 40 but was 
free of charge. 
 
Master Class: Day One 
 
The Master Class was opened with a 
warm welcome to the event by J. 
Pires from UIC who hosted the event. 
The entire Master Class was organized 
into 14 sessions. In the first session, E. 
Rome, from Fraunhofer Institute for 
Intelligent Analysis and Information 
Systems (IAIS), Germany introduced 
us to CIPRNet. He started by 
describing CIPRNet and defining 
Critical Infrastructures. He stated all 
the capabilities, benefits and goals of 
CIPRNet and how they will be 
achieved.  
 
 
 
The second session focused on 
critical infrastructure protection and 
critical infrastructure resilience. C. 
Pursiainen from the Joint Research 
Centre of the European Commission 
presented this session. Through his talk 
he explained everything about the 
concept of critical infrastructure 
resilience. Origin, approaches, 
dimensions, definitions, enhancement 
and how to measure and test 
technological resilience. 
 
The next session “Simulation of Critical 
Infrastructures (CI): relevant 
applications”, by E. Luiijf, from 
Netherlands Organisation for Applied 
Scientific Research (TNO) explained  
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the Department of Electrical and 
Computer Engineering at the 
University of Cyprus. Her research 
interests include monitoring, 
security and control of power 
systems, modeling and parameter 
estimation of loads. 
 
 
 
 
e-mail: 
polykarpou.elena@ucy.ac.cy 
Experiences from the CIPRNet Master 
Class on Modelling, Simulation and 
Analysis of Critical Infrastructures (CI) 
 
The Critical Infrastructure Community from multiple countries was reunited in 
Paris with the occasion of the first edition training event of CIPRNet.  
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where CI Protection MS&A can be 
applied and the added value for 
stakeholders. He also outlined some 
existing activities all over the world 
and what we are looking forward to. 
 
Principal modelling techniques was 
the focus of the fourth session. M. Eid 
from Atomic Energy and Alternative 
Energies Commission explained 
modelling of complex systems and 
what solutions we can have. We 
were also showed CI as a collection 
of heterogeneous interacting 
components. 
 
Modelling and investigating 
dependencies was the next topic 
presented by R. Setola from University 
Campus Bio-Medico of Rome. In this 
session we learned the importance of 
(inter)dependencies and how the 
most common phenomena can be 
modelled. We were showed some 
events and failures so that we could 
understand the consequences that 
can result if we neglect to capture 
them.  
 
V. Rosato from Italian National 
Agency for New Technologies, 
Energy and Sustainable Economic 
Development analysed us the 
topological properties of complex 
networks and their relevance for CI. 
In his talk Dr. Rosato introduced us to 
graph theory and explained how it is 
related with complex system 
properties. It was showed that 
functioning properties of complex 
networks can be found by the 
topological properties and for 
specific topological shapes of 
networks that represent CI, robustness 
and functionality criteria can be met.  
 
The seventh session, “Hybrid 
engineering/phenomenonological 
approach to simulate systems of 
systems” was presented by J. Marti, 
from the University of British 
Coloumbia, Vancouver. Prof. Marti 
discussed how multiple CIs interact in 
case of disaster response and other 
critical applications. I2Sim multi-
system 
engineering/phenomenological 
modelling was also presented. The 
i2Sim modelling framework allows the 
integration of both engineering and 
human systems. I2Sim allows real-time 
solutions of large multi-CI system of 
systems. The objective is to have a 
real-time disaster response 
optimization. Partitioning of the 
solution may be used for large and 
complex systems. 
 
The first day sessions were closed by 
B. Becker and A. Burzel from Stichting 
Deltares who introduced us to 
OpenMI (Open Modelling Interface). 
We were showed the basic concepts 
and a life demonstration example. 
OpenMI is an open model interface 
standard. It is designed for hydro-
related models and is already used 
by several institutions. With OpenMI 
time-dependent models can 
exchange data during runtime at 
each time step. OpenMI is used for 
coupling models either of different 
processes either of the same type 
allowing this way to simulate 
interaction processes. We were 
demonstrated how an open channel 
flow model is coupled with a real-
time control model.  
 
The first day was closed by a 
welcome cocktail at the UIC grand 
hall. This cocktail gave the 
participants the opportunity to know 
each other better and share their 
thoughts after attending the first eight 
sessions. It was a nice and warm 
break for the attendees giving them 
the opportunity for networking. Since 
the Master Class attracted experts 
from various fields they could discuss 
their different opinions so that they 
can overtake any issues that may 
arise and head to the goal of 
CIPRNet to create new capabilities, 
build the required capacities and 
provide knowledge and technology. 
 
 
Master Class: Day Two 
 
The Master Class continued the 
second day with the ninth session 
presented by W. Huiskamp from the 
Netherlands Organisation for Applied 
Scientific Research. This session 
focused on the federated approach 
for the simulation of complex systems. 
Mr. Huiskamp outlined the available 
architectures and standards. He 
explained High Level Architecture 
(HLA) and Distributed Simulation 
Engineering and Execution Process 
(DSEEP). 
 
Modelling, simulation and analysis 
techniques for CIP were described by 
A. Usov from Fraunhofer Institute for 
Intelligent Analysis and Information 
Systems (IAIS). Following the previous 
session for federated simulation a 
comparison was made with 
integrated modelling and simulation. 
For a better understanding, an 
example for both approaches was 
analysed, i2Sim framework for the 
integrated approach and DIESIS 
architectural approach for the 
federated. In this session it was 
showed that for many CIP 
applications modelling and 
simulation is very useful and the 
analysis of multi-CI is challenging.  
 
 E. van Veldhoven from the 
Netherlands Organisation for Applied 
Scientific Research highlighted the 
importance of verification and 
validation. In this talk Mr. Van 
Veldhoven convinced us for the 
need of verification and validation in 
a structured way and with the right 
technique. He explained that more 
benefits are gained by V&V in 
comparison to the cost. An overview 
of the techniques was presented and 
how we should choose the right one 
for our CI models. In the end, we 
were outlined the four basic 
categories of tests that can be used.  
 
The eleventh session was presented 
by M. Pollino from the Italian National 
Agency for New Technologies, 
Energy and Sustainable Economic 
Development. Mr. Pollino discussed 
the Geographical information 
systems for visualisation and analysis. 
The basic concepts and 
functionalities of Geomatics were 
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outlined. We were presented 
examples of applications, integration 
of the technique and computational 
modules. In addition, the case of an 
earthquake event was analysed to 
show us the resulting impact and the 
consequences.  
 
Real-time event prediction was 
described in the twelfth session by A. 
Zijderveld from Stichting Deltares. Mrs. 
Zijderveld explained that 
measurements and sensors enhance 
the accuracy and reliability of 
forecasting whereas probabilistic 
forecasting can create uncertainties. 
Hazard prediction may result by 
combining the available measured 
data and model simulations. In 
addition, we were also showed some 
examples for better illustration. 
Nowadays, the real-time services are 
increasing both in quality and lead-
time.  
 
The sessions closed V. Rosato from 
Italian National Agency for New 
Technologies, Energy and Sustainable 
Economic Development. The focus 
was on the Decision Support system 
(DSS) in the area of risk management 
of CI. We were presented the DSS 
and how it is used in the risk 
management of CI. A DSS must be 
able to observe and predict an 
event, the harm scenario, the 
impacts and consequences from 
damages and help decision makers 
to compile useful information, identify 
critical situations and take decisions.  
 
The Master Class finished with a very 
interesting discussion by everyone. 
With the final comments it was 
obvious that the goal of the Master 
Class to strengthen the links and 
create common views was achieved. 
Various opinions from many sides 
were expressed. 
 
 
Master Class Summary 
 
The Master Class was very well 
organized and accomplished all its 
initial goals. It attracted people from 
various areas making the discussions 
particularly interesting. The 
participants consisted of people from 
multiple countries all over the world 
giving the opportunity to each one 
expressing their opinion based on 
their own experiences and points of 
view. It achieved to give the chance 
for networking, bring diverse 
communities together and give the 
chance for future collaborations. The 
attendees had also the chance to 
learn about modelling, simulation 
and analysis of CI from the best in the 
field experts. By having people of 
all ages and levels of expertise it was 
like a baptism for entering the 
professional community. The event 
surpassed everyone’s expectations. 
 
 
Further Information 
 
More info along with the full program 
of the Master Class can be found at 
the official website of the event 
https://www.ciprnet.eu/endusertraini
ng.html. All the presentations are 
archived at 
https://www.ciprnet.eu/login.html 
and are available to all the 
participants.  
 
The next Master Class will be held in 
Rome, Italy where the focus will be on 
DSS. Keeping the high level of the 
training schools of CIPRNet, experts 
will be invited to talk and share their 
knowledge to everyone that will 
attend the Master Class. 
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CRITIS 2014 Conference: 9th International 
Conference on Critical Information 
Infrastructures Security 
 
Bringing together researchers and professionals from academia, industry and 
governmental organizations working in the field of the security of critical 
infrastructure systems. 
On behalf of the Steering Committee 
and the Local Organising Committee 
we are excited to invite you to submit 
papers and attend the CRITIS 2014 
conference. CRITIS 2014 will be held 
in October 2014 in Limassol, Cyprus 
and it continues a well-established 
tradition of successful annual confe-
rences. It aims at bringing together 
researchers and professionals from 
academia, industry and govern-
mental organisations working in the 
field of the security of critical 
infrastructure systems. 
 
Modern society relies on the avail-
ability and smooth operation of a 
variety of complex engineering sys-
tems. These systems are termed 
Critical Infrastructure Systems (CIS). 
Some of the most prominent examp-
les of critical infrastructure systems are 
electric power systems, telecommuni-
cation networks, water distribution 
systems, transportation systems, 
wastewater and sanitation systems, 
financial and banking systems, food 
production and distribution, and oil / 
natural gas pipelines.  
 
Our everyday life and well-being 
depend heavily on the reliable 
operation and efficient management 
of these critical infrastructures. The 
citizens expect that critical infrastruc-
ture systems will always be available 
and that, at the same time, they will 
be managed efficiently (i.e., they will 
have a low cost). Experience has 
shown that this is most often true. 
Nevertheless, critical infrastructure 
systems fail occasionally. Their failure 
may be due to natural disasters (e.g., 
earthquakes and floods), accidental 
failures (e.g., equipment failures, soft-
ware bugs, and human errors), or 
malicious attacks (either direct or 
remote). When critical infrastructures 
fail, the consequences are tremen-
dous. These consequences may be 
classified into societal, health, and 
economic. 
 

 
The venue of the CRITIS 2014 confe-
rence will be the magnificent Grand 
Resort Hotel, in Limassol, Cyprus. The 
hotel is set in over 20,000 square 
meters of beautifully landscaped gar-
dens with exotic trees and sub-
tropical plants, which extend right 
down to the seashore. 
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Conference Topics 
 
• Infrastructure resilience and 
survivability  
• Security and protection of 
complex cyber-physical systems  
• Self-healing, self-protection, and 
self-management architectures  
• Cyber security in critical 
infrastructure systems 
• Critical (information-based) 
infrastructures exercises and 
contingency plans 
• Advanced forensic 
methodologies for critical 
information infrastructures 
• Economics, investments and 
incentives of critical infrastructure 
protection 
• Infrastructure dependencies: 
modelling, simulation, analysis 
and validation 
• Critical infrastructure network and 
organizational vulnerability 
analysis  
• Critical infrastructure threat and 
attack modelling  
• Public-private partnership for 
critical infrastructure resilience  
• Critical infrastructure protection 
polices at national and cross-
border levels  
• Fault diagnosis for critical 
infrastructures 
• Fault tolerant control for critical 
infrastructures 
• Security and protection of smart 
buildings 
• Detection and management of 
incidents/attacks on critical 
infrastructures 
• Preparedness, prevention, 
mitigation and planning 
 
 
Sponsorship and 
Exhibition Opportunities 
 
The CRITIS 2014 Conference is a 
unique opportunity for organizations 
to connect with up to 150 leading 
experts in the fields of security and 
protection of critical infrastructure 
and critical information systems who 
work in a variety of government, 
academic, and private sectors. This 
would be a wonderful opportunity for 
your organization to have significant 
visibility in front of an audience who 
could benefit and value from your 
participation at this conference. 
 
We are delighted to invite you to 
sponsor and/or exhibit at the CRITIS 
2014 Conference. The Organizing 
Committee is committed to providing 
an exciting and informative program 
of speakers, and facilitating 
networking and business 
opportunities for sponsors. 
 
Sponsors and exhibitors will receive 
acknowledgement prior to, during 
and after the conference through 
conference materials, the web site, 
and the plenary sessions, and enjoy 
significant contact with delegates 
during the exhibition and social 
events. The exhibition will be open for 
the duration of the conference. Our 
sponsorship and exhibitor packages 
are very attractive and cost-efficient.  
 
Please do not hesitate to contact us 
to discuss how we can customize a 
package that meets your marketing 
objectives. We are happy to work 
together with you to create an 
individual offer to ensuring the best 
result for your company.  
 
 

 
 
Conference Proceedings  
 
All accepted papers will be included 
in the conference proceedings which 
will be distributed during the 
conference. Selected papers will also 
be included in a special volume and 
published by Springer-Verlag Lecture 
Notes in Computer Science. 
 
 
Conference Program 
 
The Conference Program and 
registration details will be announced 
along the announcement of the 
accepted papers. Please stay tuned 
at the conference web site. 
 
CIPRNet Young CRITIS 
Award (CYCA) 
 
An award for outstanding research in 
Critical Infrastructure Security and 
Protection sponsored by the EU FP7 
NoE CIPRNet will honour winners at 
CRITIS 2014. It is a unique chance for 
young researchers to be recognised. 
For more information: 
cyca.critis2014.org 
 
 
 
Organisers and Contact 
Information  
 
General Chairs: 
Marios Polycarpou (University of 
Cyprus) 
Elias Kyriakides (University of Cyprus) 
 
Program Chair 
Christos Panayiotou (University of 
Cyprus)  
 
Program Co-Chairs 
Vicenç Puig (Universitat Politècnica 
de Catalunya) 
Erich Rome (Fraunhofer Institute for 
Intelligent Analysis and Information 
Systems) 
 
Publications Chair 
Georgios Ellinas (University of Cyprus) 
 
Publicity Chairs 
Demetrios Eliades (University of 
Cyprus) 
Cristina Alcaraz (University of Malaga) 
 
For more information: 
 
Elias Kyriakides (elias@ucy.ac.cy ) 
Or visit http://www.critis2014.org  
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Links 
 
ECN home page  http://www.ciprnet.eu 
ECN registration page  free registration on www.ciip-newsletter.org 
 
 
Forthcoming conferences and workshops 
IDRC 2014   http://idrc.info/programme/call-for-abstracts 24-28.08.14 Davos, Switzerland 
 
EAIS 2014   https://fedcsis.org/2014/eais   7-10.09. 14 Warsaw, Poland,  
     
CRITIS 2014   www.critis2014.org    13-15.10.14 Limassol Cyprus 
 
Swiss Cyber Storm  www.swisscyberstorm.com   22. O8.14 Lucerne Switzerland 
 
 
Exhibitions 
 
Interschutz 2015   http://www.interschutz.de/86385  8.-13.6.2015 Hannover ,Germany 
 
 
Master Class 
 
Program and info  https://www.ciprnet.eu/endusertraining.html  
Presentations (on request only: https://www.ciprnet.eu/login.html 
 
Associations 
 
Global Risk Forum Davos  www.grforum.org
Swiss Cyber Storm  www.swisscyberstorm.com/ 
 
 
Institutions 
 
National and European  www.neisas.eu
Information Sharing & Alerting System 
Networks of Networks  http:/ gordion.casaccia.enea.it 
Mechanism for civil protection, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/disaster_response/mechanism_en.htm
 
 
Project home pages 
 
FP7 CIPRNet   www.ciprnet.eu
EU Security Liaison Officer  www.slo-project.eu 
Conference contributions: www.coseritylab.it(for download)
FP 7 INTACT   www.meteo.unican.es/projects/intact
PREDICT   www.predict-project.eu
 
 
Interesting Downloads 
 
Critis’12 Conf. Proceedings:  www.springer.com/computer/security+and+cryptology/book/978-3-642-41484-8
Critis’13 Conf. Proceedings:   http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-03964-0
 
European Network and Information Security Agency www.ENISA.eu publishes reports and other material on “Resilience of 
Networks and Services and Critical Information Infrastructure Protection”  
ENISA    www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP 
 
 
Websites of Contributors 
 
Joint Research Centre  http://ipsc.jrc.ec.europa.eu 
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CRITIS 2014 
 
9th International Conference on  
Critical Information Infrastructures Security 
October 13-15, 2014, Limassol, Cyprus 
www.critis2014.org 
 
